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ARTICLES

JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER SEQRA:
A STATISTICAL STUDY
Michael B. Gerrard*
INTRODUCTION

Nearly 2000 judicial opinions were issued under the State
Environmental Quality Review Act ("SEQRA")' between its
enactment in 1975 and the end of 2000.2 Almost 700 were issued
from 1990 (when the author began undertaking an annual review of
SEQRA cases for the New York Law Journal)through 2000.' These
numbers are large enough to serve as a basis for a statistically valid
review of case outcomes.
This article is divided into five parts. Part I presents statistics on
the SEQRA cases. Part II reviews the history of how the Court of
Appeals has decided SEQRA cases. Part III lists some of the issues
that have been litigated over the years and breaks them down into
the resolved issues, the open issues yet to be resolved, and the
* For biographical information on Mr. Gerrard, see Michael B. Gerrard, Reflections on
Environmental Justice, 65 ALB. L. REV. 357, 357 n.* (2001).
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101-8-0117 (McKinney 1997).
2 See 2 MICHAEL B. GERRARD, DANIEL A. RUzOw & PHILIP WEINBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT REVIEW IN NEWYORK, TC-1 to TC-40 (Tables of Cases) (1990 & 2001 Supp.).
' Id. See also Michael B. Gerrard, Ten Years of SEQRA Litigation: A StatisticalAnalysis,
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 24, 2000, at 3; see generally Michael B. Gerrard, A Review of 2000 SEQRA
Cases, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 23, 2001, at 3; Michael B. Gerrard, How SEQRA Cases Fared in 1998,
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 22, 1999, at 3; Michael B. Gerrard, A Review of 1997 SEQRA Cases, N.Y. L.J.,
May 22, 1998, at 3; Michael B. Gerrard & Deborah Goldberg, Update on SEQRA Lawsuits for
1996, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 28, 1997, at 3; Michael B. Gerrard & Deborah Goldberg, An Update on
SEQRA Lawsuits for 1995, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 22, 1996, at 3; Michael B. Gerrard & Deborah
Goldberg, Update on SEQRA Lawsuits for 1994, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 24, 1995, at 3; Stephen L.
Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, Update on SEQRA Lawsuits for 1993, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 22, 1994, at
3; Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, Update on SEQRA Lawsuits for 1992, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 26, 1993, at 3; Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, SEQRA Update for 1991, N.Y.
L.J., Mar. 27, 1992, at 3; and Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, SEQRA Update-1990,
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 29, 1991, at 3.
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persistently gnawing issues that are not likely to be resolved. Part
IV identifies the legal nemeses of the various participants in the
SEQRA process. Part V attempts to distill the caselaw under
SEQRA into one sentence.

I. STATISTICS ON SEQRA CASES
Table I herein presents an analysis of the court decisions issued
under SEQRA from January 1990 through December 2000-a
period of eleven years. There were 697 decisions during this
period.' These are all the cases known to the author; they include
all reported decisions, and many unreported decisions. There may
well be other unreported decisions not included in this enumeration.
Several conclusions are apparent from these numbers. The
number of decisions per year is remarkably constant. The average
is sixty-three decisions per year, and5 it has never varied by more
than plus or minus thirteen decisions.
The number of final environmental impact statements ("EISs")
dropped after 1993,6 while the number of cases challenging EISs did
not.7 This means that the percentage of EISs that led to court
decisions increased significantly, from about 7% during the first half
of the 1990s to about 15% during the second half of that decade.
Unfortunately the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation (NYSDEC) stopped counting the number of negative
declarations (i.e., decisions that no EIS is required for a particular
action) in 1994.8 During the first half of the 1990s, however,
roughly 2.4% of negative declarations led to court decisions. 9
The single best indicator of whether the plaintiff (usually, but not
always, a project opponent) or the defendant (always at least one

4 See infra Table I.

' With a total of seventy-six judicial decisions concerning State Environmental Quality
Review Act (SEQRA), N.Y. Envtl. Law § 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1997), cases in that
year, 1990 represents the "high water mark" over the past eleven years. 1997 represents the
"low water mark," with a total of just fifty-one SEQRA cases decided that year. Id.
6 In 1993, a total of 170 final EISs were submitted to the NYSDEC. By 1994 that number
had declined to 113, and has hovered around 100 per year ever since. Id.
7 Twelve EISs were challenged in 1993. From then to present, the total number of EISs
submitted in a given year has risen to as high as eighteen (in 1995 and 1997). Id.
' See Michael B. Gerrard, A Review of 2000 SEQRA Cases, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 23, 2001, at 3
(citing a personal communication with Jack Nasca of the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) on March 7, 2001, in which Mr. Nasca informed the
author that "[t]he DEC no longer compiles statistics on negative declarations").
9 See 1 GERRARD, Ruzow & WEINBERG, supra note 2, §§ 1.03[1], 7.04[5] (tabulating,
respectively, the number of negative declarations, and the number of court decisions on
projects without EISs for the period of time noted above).
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government agency, and often one or more project applicants) was
more likely to win a particular SEQRA case was whether an EIS
had been prepared in that case. Plaintiffs won 11% of the cases in
which an EIS had been prepared, whereas plaintiffs won 28% of the
cases in which no EIS had been prepared.10 In other words,
plaintiffs in SEQRA cases wherein an EIS had not been prepared
won almost three times more often than plaintiffs in SEQRA cases
wherein an EIS had been prepared." There was no great change in
these percentages over the decade, nor were there any obvious
trends.
This last observation may be useful in predicting the outcome of
future SEQRA cases. If an EIS has been prepared, plaintiffs
apparently start out with about a one-in-ten chance of winning. On
the other hand, if there has been no EIS, plaintiffs tend to have
closer to a one-in-three chance of winning. Taking these odds into
account, one can then look at the specific facts of a particular case to
form a judgment about whether that case is going to have a
significantly greater or smaller chance of success than these
average percentages would indicate.
II. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS
Table II herein lists all the decisions issued by the Court of
Appeals under SEQRA from 1981 (the year of the first such
decision 1 2) through 2000.3 There are a total of forty-four cases
listed below.1 4 Pro-environmental plaintiffs won eight of these
cases; these victories were almost entirely in the 1980s. 5 There was
one plaintiffs' victory in 1997-Kahn v. Pasnik,1 6 affirming an
appellate division decision that. a negative declaration was wrongly
issued under some fairly egregious facts.1 7 Other than that,

'0 Infra Table I.
" Based on the historical data, plaintiffs unquestionably have a much better chance of
winning a SEQRA challenge if no EIS has been prepared. The lowest annual percentage of
plaintiff-wins in cases without an EIS was 18%, in 1997 and 1998; whereas the percentage of
plaintiff-wins in cases with an EIS only rose this high twice-28% in 1995 and 23% in 2000.

Id.
Harlem Valley United Coalition v. Hall, 430 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 1981).
,3 Soho Alliance v. N.Y. City Bd. of Standards and Appeals, 741 N.E.2d 106 (N.Y. 2000).
12
14

Infra Table II.

15 Id.
16 687 N.E.2d 402 (N.Y. 1997).
17 See id. at 403-04 (affirming

the decision below, finding that the defendant-a village
board-had utterly failed to take the requisite hard look at the pertinent areas of
environmental concern).
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plaintiffs have not won a SEQRA case in the Court of Appeals since
Village of Westbury v. Department of Transportation18 in 1989.
The plaintiffs' victories in the 1980s included four of the iconic
pro-plaintiff SEQRA cases: Chinese Staff and Workers Ass'n v. City
of New York,' 9 concerning socioeconomic effects; 20 Save the Pine
Bush, Inc. v. City of Albany, 21 on cumulative impacts; 22 Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of New York v. Board of Estimate,2 3 on eligibility for
lead agency status; 24 and Village of Westbury v. Department of
25
on segmentation. 26
Transportation,
All of the most important Court of Appeals SEQRA decisions
since 1989 have been victories for governmental defendants: The
Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. County of Suffolk,27 on
standing;2" Long Island Pine Barrens Society v. Planning Board,29
v. McNally, 3 1 on relaxed
on cumulative impacts; 30 and Merson
32
standards of procedural compliance.
Few of these cases were even close; of the forty-four Court of
Appeals SEQRA decisions since 1981, all but six were unanimous.
It is not immediately apparent why environmental plaintiffs have
had such a drought in the Court of Appeals since 1989. The
,s 549 N.E.2d 1175 (N.Y. 1989).
'9 502 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1986).
20 See id. at 181 (holding that, under SEQRA, an agency must consider socioeconomic
impacts, including the potential displacement of residents and business, as well as any
anticipated change in the "character" of the community).
21 512 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1987).
22 See id. at 527 (stating that the "cumulative impact of other proposed or pending projects
must be considered" under SEQRA).
23 532 N.E.2d 1261 (N.Y. 1988).
24 See id. at 1265 (noting that SEQRA is violated when the determination of a project's
environmental impact is not made by an agency with authority over the project).
25 549 N.E.2d 1175 (N.Y. 1989).
26 See id. at 1178 (holding that it was improper to consider separately the effects of various
segments of the same overall project).
27 573 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1991).
28 See id. at 1043-44 (requiring plaintiffs attempting to show standing to plead a "special
injury"-i.e., an injury different from the injury, if any, to the public-at-large). Society of
Plastics was a sweeping decision, one which redefined the requirements for standing under
SEQRA. See generally Joan Leary Matthews, Unlocking the Courthouse Doors: Removal of
the "SpecialHarm" Requirement Under SEQRA, 65 ALB. L. REV. 421, 453-457 (2001) (arguing
that the heightened standing requirements after Society of Plastics are draconian, and should
be modified).
29 606 N.E.2d 1373 (N.Y. 1992).
30 See id. at 1379 (holding that the impacts of 224 contemporaneously planned projects in
the Long Island Pine Barrens need not be considered cumulatively, since the projects were
not part of a "cohesive framework").
" 688 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1997).
32 See id. at 483-84, 486 (allowing a conditional negative declaration to be issued for a Type
I project, despite regulations seemingly to the contrary).
" Infra Table II.
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impression one gets from these decisions is of a court that is
enormously deferential to administrative decisions, at least when
regulatory-as opposed to constitutional-questions are at stake.
III. LITIGATED ISSUES
A number of issues have appeared frequently in SEQRA
litigation. Some of these issues have been conclusively decided;
other issues are still open, while still others are likely never to be
resolved.
These issues are categorized below, together with
citations to leading decisions that embody any prevailing rule.
A. Resolved Issues
1. Standard of Review
The New York courts grant considerable deference to the
technical decisions of administrative agencies.
One prominent
example is the 1990 Court of Appeals decision Akpan v. Koch,34 a
challenge to an urban renewal project in Brooklyn.3 5 Opponents
presented voluminous expert reports urging that the EIS analysis
was deeply flawed.3 6 The court would have none of it; the defendant
City of New York had studied the issues and reached a reasoned
conclusion.3" It was not for the courts to second-guess the City's
judgments.3 8 This deference is the major reason why, as just noted,
plaintiffs seldom win cases in which EISs have been prepared.
2. Procedural Compliance
Over the years, several cases had declared that strict procedural
compliance was required under SEQRA, and that even minor
procedural errors would lead to nullification of a decision.39 This
554 N.E.2d 53 (N.Y. 1990).
See id. at 54 (detailing the goals of the renewal plan; specifically, to replace structurally
impaired buildings with new housing, as well as with parks and other facilities).
36 See id. at 58-59 (presenting plaintiffs' various criticisms of the defendant City of New
York's housing study and EIS).
31 See id. at 57-60 (noting that the issue of "secondary displacement," the plaintiffs main
concern, had been raised at every level of the SEQRA process).
31 See id. at 57 (defining the proper scope of judicial review of an agency's substantive
compliance with SEQRA as a "meaningful" inquiry, yet not so searching a review that the
court is merely substituting its judgment for that of the agency).
" See King v. Saratoga County Bd. of Supervisors, 675 N.E.2d 1185, 1188, (N.Y. 1996)
(citing E.F.S. Ventures Corp. v. Foster, 520 N.E.2d 1345 (N.Y. 1988); Chinese Staff, 502
N.E.2d 176; and Tri-County Taxpayers Ass'n v. Town Bd., 432 N.E.2d 592 (N.Y. 1982) to
14

"
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doctrine, however, was never firmly established in practice, and it
was largely cast aside in 1997 in Merson v. McNally,40 in which the
Court of Appeals authorized, under some circumstances, a
conditioned negative declaration for a Type I action 4 1 (an action
more likely than others to require an EIS) despite an EIS regulation
4
that seems to prohibit such a declaration:.
This decision signaled
that minor procedural irregularities will be forgiven, especially if
the public has been given full opportunity to participate in the
discussions. Absolutely strict procedural compliance continues to be
the domain of the Election Law. 3
3. Role of SEQRA in Decision-Making
When SEQRA review establishes the presence or absence of an
impact, that decision is binding, at least on the lead agency. For
example, in WEOK BroadcastingCorp. v. PlanningBoard,44 an EIS
had concluded that a proposed radio broadcasting tower would not
have a negative aesthetic impact. 45 The lead agency-a town
planning board-then disapproved the tower on grounds of its
potential aesthetic impact. 6 The Court of Appeals found this
inconsistency between the EIS and the agency's decision to be
impermissible and upheld WEOK's application. 7

illustrate the "strict compliance" principle); see also Williamsburg Around the Bridge Block
Ass'n v. Giuliani, 644 N.Y.S.2d 252, 259 (App. Div. 1996) (explaining that stringent
compliance with SEQRA's requirements is essential, as merely "substantial" compliance
would allow government agencies to bypass SEQRA's essential mandates); Rye Town/King
Civic Ass'n v. Town of Rye, 442 N.Y.S.2d 67, 71 (App. Div. 1981) (noting that the legislature,
when enacting SEQRA, expressly stated that SEQRA should be interpreted and administered
to "the fullest extent possible" (citing N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0103 (McKinney 1997)).
40 688 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1997)
41 See id. at 484-86 (allowing

modifications despite the fact that the modification might, in
form, appear identical to an impermissible conditioned negative declaration).
42 See N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.7(d)(1) (2000) (prohibiting-by
omission-the use of conditioned negative declarations in Type I projects).
4"See Pierce v. Breen, 657 N.E.2d 1304, 1305 (N.Y. 1995) (stating that to relax strict
compliance with election procedures would "dilute the integrity of the election process");
Staber v. Parrilla, 482 N.E.2d 1204, 1205-06 (N.Y. 1985) (explaining, with perhaps
unwarranted optimism, how strict compliance with election laws insures that candidates will
be prevented from manipulating the election process).
4
592 N.E.2d 778 (N.Y. 1992).
" See id. at 779 (noting that the environmental impact statement (EIS) had addressed the
potential visual impacts of the tower at nine separate locations, and found no significant
impact at any of these locations).
46 See id. at 780.
41 See id. at 783 (annulling the board's determination "because it [was] not supported by
substantial evidence," but, rather, by statements from members of the community disputing
the findings of the EIS).
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4. Lead Agency Selection
Until the late 1980s, there was considerable uncertainty over
which agencies were eligible to serve as lead agencies in the SEQRA
process.48 The lead agency has a crucial role; it decides whether an
EIS is necessary, and, if so, what the EIS must contain, whether a
draft EIS is adequate, and what the final EIS should say.49 The
City of New York designated two permanent co-lead agencies for all
of its SEQRA matters, but in 1988 in Coca-ColaBottling Co. of New
York v. Board of Estimate" the Court of Appeals annulled this
practice and declared that only "involved agencies"-that is,
agencies that have an actual decision-making role, as opposed to an
advisory role-may be the lead agency. 1
5. Role of Expert v. Amateur Opinion
SEQRA controversies frequently become battles of experts, but
two rules have clearly emerged: one expert followed by the lead
agency beats any number of experts by opponents,5 2 and non-expert
views expressing general opposition count for nothing. 3

See, e.g., Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 466 N.Y.S.2d 828, 831 (App. Div.
1983) (holding impermissible the designation of an Environmental Quality Review Board as
lead agency on city projects, because the Board lacked jurisdiction to approve the project in
the first instance); Congdon v. Washington County, 512 N.Y.S.2d 970, 975 (Sup. Ct. 1986)
(holding that, though harmless in this case, the government's designation of two lead
agencies was erroneous).
41 See ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0111(6) (McKinney 1997) (corresponds to current version
(McKinney 2001)).
'0 532 N.E.2d 1261 (N.Y. 1988).
51 See id. at 1265 (noting that SEQRA's purpose and policy are subverted when two
separate agencies, only one of which is the lead agency, divide their responsibilities under
SEQRA); see also 1 GERRARD, Ruzow & WEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.03[3][a] (defining
"involved agencies").
51 See Sprint Spectrum v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 646 (2d. Cir. 1999) (allowing a planning
board to disregard the opinion of the applicant's expert where the board's own expert had
advanced a different opinion); Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Jorling, 649 N.E.2d 1145, 1154 (N.Y.
1995) (stating that the NYSDEC was not required to accept assertions by chemical industry
experts unsupported by scientific data, and, further, that the NYSDEC had no burden to
demonstrate the invalidity of the unsupported data); Village of Harriman v. Town Bd. of
Monroe, 544 N.Y.S.2d 860, 862 (App. Div. 1989) (noting that petitioners had failed to produce
tests of their own to refute the agency's conclusions).
" See WEOK Broad. Corp. v. Planning Bd., 592 N.E.2d 778, 783-84 (N.Y. 1992) (stating
that "generalized community objections" alone do not rise to the level of substantial evidence
upon which to make SEQRA decisions).
48
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6. Aesthetics Counts
Aesthetics have firmly been established as a valid basis for
municipal regulation, and a project subject to discretionary review
54
can, under the right circumstances, be rejected because it is ugly.
B. Open Issues
1. Standing for Shared Exposure
In 1991, in The Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. County of
Suffolk,55 the Court of Appeals created the doctrine that, in order to
have standing to bring a SEQRA case, a plaintiff must not only be
affected by the challenged action; she must also be affected
differently than the public-at-large. 6
This doctrine has the
potential to shield from review many "classic" environmental
impacts-such as air and water pollution-that equally affect
everyone nearby. New York's doctrine of standing in environmental
cases has no parallel in either federal standing law or the laws of
most other states, 57 and thus makes New York one of the most
restrictive jurisdictions for environmental plaintiffs. Some lower
courts have found ways around this rule,58 and a number of
commentators are critical of it. 9
This rule can fairly be
characterized as unstable, and certainly will generate great interest
should it reach the Court of Appeals again.

4 See Sprint Spectrum, 176 F.3d at 645, 647-48 (upholding denial of site plan approval for
three communication towers because of their potential for negative aesthetic impact); Holmes
v. Brookhaven Town Planning Bd., 524 N.Y.S.2d 492, 494 (App. Div. 1988) (nullifying a
negative declaration for failure to consider the aesthetic impacts of a shopping center).
" 573 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1991).
56 Id. at 1043-44.
" See Matthews, supra note 28, at 450-53 (discussing the "special harm" requirement set
forth by the Court of Appeals in the Society of Plastics case, and comparing New York's
SEQRA standing requirements after this case to that of several other states).
"' See, e.g., Comm. to Preserve Brighton Beach & Manhattan Beach, Inc. v. Planning
Comm'n of New York, 695 N.Y.S.2d 7, 12 (App. Div. 1999) (stating that the neighboring
landowners' (petitioners') injuries, which were related to aesthetics and quality-of-life issues,
nonetheless satisfied the requirements for standing); Long Island Pine Barrens, 690 N.Y.S.2d
at 97 (finding that petitioners who alleged they had experienced rust in their drinking water,
and whose wells had been tested as possible replacement water, had standing to challenge
the sale of nearby land).
" See generally Matthews, supra note 28, at 453.

2001]

SEQRA: A Statistical Study

2. Statute of Limitations Accrual
The general rule is that when a lead agency has issued a negative
declaration under SEQRA and subsequently approves the project,
the statute of limitations accrues upon approval. 60 However, a few
Division, Third
decisions, especially from the Appellate
Department, have held that accrual begins upon issuance of the
negative declaration. 6' This has led to a good deal of confusion, as
well as to the "protective" early filing of lawsuits by plaintiffs not
wishing to run afoul of this rule.
3. Cumulative Impacts/Segmentation
Two related continuing areas of uncertainty are when there has
been a failure to consider cumulative impacts, and when there has
been impermissible segmentation. 62 The leading case on cumulative
impacts is Long Island Pine Barrens Society v. Planning Board,6 3
which allowed more than 200 different projects in an ecologically
sensitive area of Suffolk County to be considered separately under
SEQRA, despite their concededly common effect on groundwater
supplies.' Shortly after Long Island Pine Barrens was decided,
NYSDEC created a task force to study potential amendments to the
SEQRA regulations on cumulative impacts.6 5 The task force issued
a report in 1999, but no action has been taken on it thus far.66

6 See Hickey v. Planning Bd., 571 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (App. Div. 1991).
61 See, e.g., J.B. Realty Enter. Corp. v. City of Saratoga Springs, 704 N.Y.S.2d 742, 745
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 2000) (holding that the statute of limitations began to run when the City's
Design Review Commission issued a negative declaration); Wing v. Coyne, 517 N.Y.S.2d 576,
578 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1987) (holding that the statute of limitations begins to run when a
decision is "final and binding").
62 The former question arises when impacts from different projects may combine to
degrade a common resource, such as an aquifer; the latter arises when there is debate over
whether the project under consideration is actually part of a larger undertaking. The two
doctrines, however, often blur into each other. See, e.g., City of Buffalo v. N.Y. State Dep't of
Envtl. Conserv., 707 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (in case concerning relationship between a
proposed bridge and toll plaza, segmentation and cumulative impact language interspersed).
63 606 N.E.2d 1373 (N.Y. 1992).
See id. at 1378 (stating that the government's policy with regard to the Pine Barrens, as
opposed to a government plan, was not a "sufficiently unifying ground for tying otherwise
unrelated projects together"); see also supranote 30 and accompanying text.
65 John M. Armentano, Environmental Action Committee:
Group Report Requests
Guidelines for Cumulative-ImpactAssessments, N.Y. L.J., July 28, 1999, at 5.
66 Id.
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C. Persistently Gnawing Issues
1. Cross-Agency Jurisdiction
In some municipalities there are specialized boards and
commissions that deal with such matters as local wetlands permits
and architectural review. Controversies occasionally arise when
one of these specialized bodies, acting as an involved agency,
reaches conclusions at odds with those of the lead agency (often a
planning board) as to the impacts of a project.6 7 If an EIS
supervised by a planning board concludes that a project will not
have a negative effect on wetlands, but the wetlands commission
reaches the opposite conclusion, it is easy to envision litigation, but
it is somewhat more difficult to predict the outcome.
2. Self-Serving Lead Agencies
When the Legislature enacted SEQRA in 1975 it chose to allow
agencies that were project proponents to serve as lead agencies.68
For example, if the State Department of Transportation wishes to
build a new highway, it can be the lead agency for that project. The
theory behind this approach is that environmental considerations
will be taken most seriously if the entity that is planning the project
must also handle the SEQRA compliance. 69 However, citizen groups
frequently complain that this eliminates objective review and leads
to biased environmental reviews.70 This complaint has had no
traction, however, in the courts.71
3. Inconsistency Among Lead Agencies
There is no mechanism under SEQRA to ensure that different
lead agencies reach consistent results. Some municipalities tend to
67 See

1 GERRARD, RUZOW & WEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.03[3][a]

(describing the

procedure for dealing with one such scenario-specifically, in the instance where the lead
agency has prepared an EIS which an involved agency finds "inadequate for purposes of its
own decision-making').
68 See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0111(6) (defining lead agency); see also 1 GERRARD,
Ruzow & WEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.03[1] (discussing the pros and cons of allowing the
project sponsor to act as lead agency).
1 GERRARD, Ruzow & WEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.03[1].
70 See id. (noting that project opponents generally fear that if a lead agency already
69

supports a project before assessing its environmental impacts, the agency is likely to proceed
with bias).
71 id.
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be pro-development and will issue negative declarations for
relatively large projects; other municipalities are anti-development
and will require EISs for much smaller projects. At the federal
level, the President's Council on Environmental Quality7 2 strives for
agencies to behave in a more or less consistent fashion under the
National Environmental Policy Act. 3 SEQRA gives no comparable
role to NYSDEC or to any other entity. The inevitably inconsistent
results frequently lead to dissatisfaction by parties that are
unhappy with the results of the SEQRA process on a project that
concerns them.
4. Consent Orders as SEQRA Exemptions
In New York Public Interest Research Group v. Town of Islip,74 the
Court of Appeals ruled that an action taken pursuant to a consent
order with DEC (in that case, the vertical expansion of a landfill)
fell within SEQRA's exemption for enforcement proceedings. 75 As a
result, a number of substantial projects have been built without any
SEQRA review at all, leading to great frustration for project
opponents.
5. Preliminary Injunction Bonds
New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules (C.P.L.R.) section
6312(b) 76 requires that no preliminary injunction may be granted
without the posting of a bond by the plaintiff. There is no SEQRA
exemption to this rule.
Some courts in issuing preliminary
injunctions have required only nominal bonds, but others have
required bonds that are so large that the plaintiffs were unable to
post them, the injunction never went into effect, and the project was
built.7 7

71

See Exec. Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (Mar. 7, 1970), reprinted as amended in

42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994) (establishing and defining the responsibilities of the Council of

Environmental Quality).
7' National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4370 (1994).
74 520 N.E.2d 517 (N.Y. 1988).
71 Id. at 524.
76 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6312(b) (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 2001).
77 2 GERRARD, Ruzow & WEINBERG, supra note 2, § 7.16[1][b][iv].
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IV. THE NEMESES

In SEQRA litigation, each of the classes of parties listed below
(citizen plaintiffs, applicants, and governmental agencies) have
confronted difficulties that are pervasive and specific to that class. ; s
A. Citizen Plaintiffs'Nemeses
1. Statute of Limitations
The great majority of all SEQRA cases are brought under Article
78 of the CPLR. 79 The statute of limitations for Article 78 cases is
four months s° but numerous laws in the environmental and
planning area have thirty-day statutes of limitations."1 If project
opponents have not organized, raised money, and retained counsel
by the time a project is approved, it will be very difficult for them to
file suit within four months, and often impracticable-if not
impossible-to do so within thirty days.
2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
An environmental objection to a project normally cannot be raised
in court for the first time; if the plaintiff did not raise the objection
during the administrative process, especially during the comment
period on the DEIS, she may be held to have waived her
administrative remedies.8 2 Of course, this does not apply if the
plaintiff had no opportunity to participate in the administrative

" Two of plaintiffs' primary nemeses, standing and standard of review, have been
discussed in detail above. See supra Part III. A. 1. (presenting Akpan v. Koch, 554 N.E.2d 53,
54 (N.Y. 1990), as an example of how courts typically review lead agency determinations
deferentially when an EIS has been prepared); see also supra Part III. B. 1. (contending that,
ever since the Court of Appeals in its Society of Plastics decision, heightened the
requirements for standing under SEQRA, countless cases have been dismissed because
plaintiffs were found to lack standing).
79 See 2 GERRARD, Ruzow & WEINBERG, supra note 2, § 7.03[1] (explaining that, because
SEQRA has no explicit provision for judicial review, Article 78 proceedings-designed for
challenges to the actions of administrative agencies-are the appropriate vehicle for plaintiffs
seeking to challenge specific SEQRA outcomes).
'0 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 217(1) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 2001).
"' See 2 GERRARD, RuzOw & WEINBERG, supra note 2, § 7.02[4][b] (listing the statutes of
limitations periods for various types of environmental challenges). The statutes-aptly
described by the authors of the treatise as "difficult to find"-are scattered throughout New
York's statutory compilations, including the Environmental Conservation Law, Village Law,
Local Finance Law, Executive Law, General City Law, and Town Law. Id.
2 See Aldrich v. Pattison, 486 N.Y.S.2d 23, 31 (App. Div. 1985).
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process.83 For example, there is no established procedure for the
public to comment on negative declarations before they are issued.
3. FOIL Delays
The principal mechanism for citizens to obtain information about
a project they are opposing is the New York State Freedom of
Information Law (FOIL).84
FOIL requires that requests be
acknowledged within five days of receipt, 85 but FOIL contains no
quantitative time limitations for supplying the requested
information. It is not uncommon for the comment deadline on a
DEIS, or other opportunities for public participation, to come and go
before a project's opponents ever receive the information they are
seeking under FOIL.
B. Applicants' Nemeses
1. Ripeness
Applicants who believe they are being unfairly treated by lead
agencies have little judicial recourse. Agency actions are not ripe
for review until they are final-i.e., interim actions by lead agencies
are not ripe for review 86-and a positive declaration (a decision to
require an EIS) has been held not to be a final action.8 7 Once in a
great while, an applicant will succeed in a suit against an agency
that the applicant believes is unduly delaying the application.

" See Malkin v. Tully, 412 N.Y.S.2d 186, 187-88 (App. Div. 1978) (noting that what is of
primary importance is that petitioners raise these issues "at the first opportunity").
4 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84-90 (McKinney 2001).
85 Id. at § 89(3).
86 See 2 GERRARD, RUZOW & WEINBERG, supra note 2, § 7.02[1] n.7 (citing several SEQRA
cases that illustrate the ripeness doctrine, including Zagata v. Freshwater Wetlands Appeals
Bd., 663 N.Y.S.2d 881 (App. Div. 1997); Ogden Citizens for Responsible Land Use, Ltd. v.
Planning Bd., 637 N.Y.S.2d 582 (App. Div. 1996); and Young v. Bd. of Trs., 634 N.Y.S.2d 605
(App. Div. 1996)).
87 See Sour Mountain Realty v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv., 688 N.Y.S.2d 842, 845
(App. Div. 1999) (holding that the issuance of a positive declaration is not a final
determination; it is simply a preliminary step in the overall process, and is not ripe for review
until the decision-making process is complete); see also Pilot Corp. v. Planning Bd. of
Newburgh, Index No. 5399/00, at 11 (Sup. Ct. Orange County June 2001).
8 See 2 GERRARD, Ruzow & WEINBERG, supra note 2, § 7.16[5] (citing a few of these rare
instances, including 383 Madison Assoc. v. N.Y. City Planning Comm'n, N.Y. L.J., June 20,
1988, at 25 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1988); and Pospisil v. Anderson, 518 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct.
1987)).
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This, though, is a rare event; and the litigation itself is likely to
antagonize the agency and delay matters even further.8 9
2. Unenforceability of Time Limits
Related to the ripeness issue is the fact that while SEQRA
contains various time limitations for the processing of
applications,9" these limitations essentially are unenforceable. 9'
Thus, applicants have little remedy--outside of the political
process-for dealing with many, if not most, project delays.
3. SLAPP-Suit Laws & Noerr-Pennington
Applicants would often like to sue project opponents whom the
applicants believe are defaming or otherwise impeding their
projects; such actions have been called "SLAPP suits" (Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation). 92 Since the New York
Legislature's 1992 enactment of a statute discouraging SLAPP
suits, 93 most suits of this sort have been dismissed. 94 As a related
matter, a federal antitrust rule known as the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine has blocked applicants from suing competitors who are
fomenting opposition to their projects. 95

'9

See id. at § 3.12[31 n.45-47 (citing an Appellate Division, Second Department decision in

which the court stated that "protection of 'the environment'.., far overshadows the rights of
developers to obtain prompt action on their proposals" (quoting Sun Beach Real Estate Dev.
Corp. v. Anderson, 469 N.Y.S.2d 964, 970-71 (App. Div. 1983)); see also, e.g., Sour Mountain
Realty, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 846-47 (rejecting a claimed due process violation attributable to
agency's request for a supplemental draft environmental impact statement (DEIS)).
9'See 1 GERRARD, RUZOW & WEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.12[3].
9'See id. (reporting that, in practice, "the [published regulatory] time frames may be
extended by agreement between an applicant and the lead agency") (citations omitted).
Further, "most applicants do not withhold their agreement to a time extension for fear of
alienating the very agency that possesses broad discretionary approval authority over their
pending projects." Id.
92 See 660 W. 115th St. Corp. v. Van Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d 930, 933 n.1 (N.Y. 1992)
(describing SLAPP suits generally, as well as how they often are used to burden, delay, and
intimidate project opponents).
93N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS L. § 76-a (McKinney Supp. 2001); 1992 N.Y. Laws 767.
' See, e.g., Street Beat Sportswear v. Nat'l Mobilization Against Sweatshops, 698 N.Y.S.2d
820, 826 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (dismissing a tortious interference lawsuit on the grounds that it was
a SLAPP suit under the statute).
9"See Alfred Weissman Real Estate, Inc. v. Big V Supermarkets, Inc., 707 N.Y.S.2d 647,
652 (App. Div. 2000) (noting that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, originally intended to
protect petitioners from prosecution even if their petitions were motivated by anti-competitive
intent, has been expanded to protect the First Amendment rights generally of all those who
petition the government).

20011

SEQRA: A Statistical Study
C. Agencies'Nemesis

The principal legal nemeses of lead agencies are lower court
judges who annul project approvals on grounds that are later
reversed on appeal. There is a long list of decisions, particularly in
New York City, that have followed this pattern. Examples include
cases concerning the Times Square redevelopment, 96 the Hudson
River Park, 97 the Harlem River Yards project, 98 a zoning
amendment authorizing General Large Scale Developments,9 9 and
the rezoning of the block between Eleventh and Twelfth Avenues
and 41st and 42nd Streets.'0 0 These decisions, though ultimately
reversed, often lead to long-sometimes fatal-delays in project
construction.
This almost "lottery-like" quality to decisions
discourages applicants from confining EISs to relevant subject
matters, for fear that the project may ultimately end up before a
lower court judge who would issue an unduly restrictive opinion.
V. CONCLUSION
The essence of the holdings of the nearly 2000 SEQRA decisions
can be boiled down to one sentence:
If an agency identifies the relevant areas of concern, writes them
up in moderate detail, takes action consistent with the write-up,
and follows the procedures reasonably closely, the agency is highly
likely to eventually win any SEQRA lawsuit brought against it.

9' See Jackson v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.Y.S.2d 700, 706 (App. Div. 1985),

aff'd, 494 N.E.2d 429 (N.Y. 1986) (overruling the lower court's decision to the extent that it
had enjoined the project and directed further environmental study).
9' See Hudson River Sloop Clearwater Inc. v. Cuomo, 635 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (App. Div.
1995) (reversing the lower court's finding of various violations of SEQRA on the part of
project proponents New York State and New York City).
" See South Bronx Clean Air Coalition v. N.Y. State Dep't of Transp., 630 N.Y.S.2d 73, 75
(App. Div. 1995) (finding that the lower court had impermissibly "substituted its analysis for
the expertise of the lead agency").
9 See People for Westpride, Inc. v. Bd. of Estimate, 568 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733-35 (App. Div.
1991) (reversing the lower court's ruling that the Board of Estimate had failed to take the
requisite "hard look" at significant impacts when it approved a zoning revision that, in effect,
facilitated several massive redevelopment projects without any review of the environmental
impacts of these projects).
'0o See Neville v. Koch, 575 N.Y.S.2d 463, 464-65 (App. Div. 1991) (overturning the lower
court's ruling, on the basis that SEQRA decisions must be governed by the "rule of reason";
and stating that "the lead agency is not required to identify every conceivable eventuality").
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TABLES

TABLE

Year

Final
EISs

I: OUTCOMES OF SEQRA CASES 1 '

Total
Judicial
Decisions

Challenges with
Completed EIS

1990

229

76

31

%
Plaintiffs
Win
13

1991

214

70

13

1992

171

73

1993

170

1994

Challenges
Without EIS

24

%
Plaintiffs
Win
29

0

49

24

16

4

44

27

53

12

17

33

45

113

57

12

8

32

28

1995

131

62

18

28

37

30

1996

103

70

14

7

44

34

1997

98

51

18

11

28

18

1998

100

62

18

6

40

18

1999

84

61

13

8

33

27

2000

108

62

13

23

41

29

Average

138

63

16

11

37

28

Total

Total

'0' 2 GERRARD, Ruzow & WEINBERG, supra note 2, § 7.04[5]; see also Letter from Michael
B. Gerrard, to Joseph LaValley, Editor-in-Chief, Albany Law Review 1 (Oct. 22, 2001)
(detailing how the author, over the past decade, has compiled the "raw data" from each year's
crop of SEQRA decisions, from 1990 to 2000, for his annual New York Law Journal column on
SEQRA trends) (on file with Albany Law Review).
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